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Abstract 
We construct indicators of the perception of job security for various types of jobs in 12 European countries 
using individual data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). We then consider the relation 
between reported job security and OECD summary measures of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) 
strictness on one hand, and Unemployment Insurance Benefit (UIB) generosity on the other. We find that, after 
controlling for selection into job types, workers feel most secure in permanent public sector jobs, least secure in 
temporary jobs, with permanent private sector jobs occupying an intermediate position. We also find that 
perceived job security in both permanent private and temporary jobs is positively correlated with UIB 
generosity, while the relationship with EPL strictness is negative: workers feel less secure in countries where 
jobs are more protected. These correlations are absent for permanent public jobs, suggesting that such jobs are 
perceived to be by and large insulated from labor market fluctuations. 
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1 Introduction
The most common policies used to protect workers against labor market risk are Employment
Protection Legislation (EPL) and Unemployment Insurance Benefits (UIB). The effect of EPL on
indicators of labor market performance is an arguably rare example of agreement among economists.
Greater employment protection is thought to discourage both firing and hiring, with an overall
ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate. The main effect of EPL is to reduce the permeability
of the barrier between work and unemployment. This conclusion, which results from most recent
equilibrium labor market models, is largely borne out by empirical research.1 UIB generosity, on
the other hand, is less clearly related to aggregate labor market flows (or aggregate labor market
indicators in general). As such, UIB are generally thought of as being more compatible with the
demand for labor market flexibility.2
While there is apparent agreement on the macroeconomic impact of EPL and UIB, only very
few studies have asked how these institutions affect workers’perceptions of their job security. Yet
the question would seem to be of obvious importance, as it seems likely that policy makers are
responsive to the expression of public sentiments of “social insecurity”. The primary aim of this
paper is to address that question.
The balance between labor market flexibility and security is a live policy issue. One of the
campaign posters of Arlette Laguiller, the candidate for one of the far-left wing parties calling
itself Lutte Ouvrie`re (literally: “Workers’ Struggle”), in the 2002 French presidential election
stated: “Arlette Laguiller—Always on the workers’ side—Ban layoffs”. The baseline argument
behind the proposal to “ban layoffs” is that all-powerful shareholders use labor force adjustments
to maximize their profits, and in so doing they let workers bear all the financial risk, thus creating
social insecurity. Judging by the 2002 election results,3 the idea to make layoffs illegal sounded
1See Addison and Texeira (2003), OECD (1999) or the excellent survey in Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004). Further,
as it affects private decisions about job creation and destruction, EPL can obviously be thought of as serving a more
general purpose than just to protect workers against layoff risks. See Blanchard and Tirole (2004).
2While raising other standard incentive-related problems. Here also, we refer the reader to the corresponding
chapter in Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).
3Arlette Laguiller received 5.72% of the votes. Yet the platfoms of at least three other left wing parties—the
Ligue Communiste Re´volutionnaire (Revolutionary Communist League), the Parti Communiste Franc¸ais (French
Communist Party) and the Parti des Travailleurs (Workers’ Party)—also contained similar proposals concerning
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appealing to a nontrivial fraction of French voters.
The more “official” view of the European Union on flexibility and security is somewhat dif-
ferent. The 2003 Employment Guidelines for Member States4 recommend that “Member States
will facilitate the adaptability of workers and firms to change, taking account of the need for both
flexibility and security [. . .]. Member States will review and, where appropriate, reform overly re-
strictive elements in employment legislation that affect labour market dynamics [. . .].” While social
insecurity is definitely a matter of concern in many official EU documents,5 the current trend in
addressing social insecurity seems to be toward institutions that are more friendly to labor market
dynamics. In short, less EPL and, to an extent deemed reasonable, more UIB.
The extent to which the reforms actually implemented conform with those broad recommen-
dations varies across Member States. While the Dutch 1999 “Flexibility and Security Act” or
the Danish agenda on “flexicurity” are clearly in line with the EU view, other (mostly Southern)
countries are more hesitant. In fact, many authors have noticed that standard indicators of EPL
strictness and UIB generosity are negatively correlated across European countries.
The origin of this apparent trade-off is a subject of active theoretical research. Saint-Paul (2000,
2002) analyzes political economy models of the choice of labor market institutions, in which EPL
and UIB are treated separately. Boeri, Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003) offer a thorough theoretical
exploration of the EPL-UIB trade-off, which they view as different realizations of stable politico-
economic equilibria. One recurring point in this literature is that EPL is essentially championed
by insiders—those who already have a job—who protect their associated rent, whereas UIB mostly
favor outsiders. Labor market institutions then have a feedback effect on this conflict of interests,
both because they impact on the composition of the labor force, and also because they directly
dismissals. In total (including Arlette Laguiller), these parties together received 13.71% of the votes.
4Published in the Official Journal of the European Union, and available online (English version) at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment social/employment strategy/guidelines en.htm. See also the UK Depart-
ment for Work and Pensions’ Report “Full employment in every region”, Paragraph 2.12: “It is inevitable and
desirable that people will change jobs during their working lives”.
5One of the two parts of Priority 7 of the European Union’s 6th Research Programme specifically mentions labor
market insecurity. One of the four parts of the European Working Conditions Observatory’s definition of quality of
work is “ensuring career and employment security”. Some of the recent projects funded by the European Union are
entitled “Employment Precarity, Unemployment and Social Exclusion”, “Social Exclusion and Social Protection—the
future role for the EU”, and “Precarious employment in Europe: a Comparative Study of Labour Market Related
Risks in Flexible Economies”.
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affect insiders’ rents.
While we do not claim to provide a complete empirical counterpart of that theoretical literature,
in this paper we consider what comparative large scale survey data can teach us about the relation
between workers’ perceived job security and labor market institutions. We use data from the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to explicitly address the issue of job security, as
reported by workers in twelve European countries. We then consider the relation between this
reported job security and standard OECD summary measures of EPL strictness on the one hand,
and UIB generosity on the other. Our use of panel data allows us to explicitly model worker selection
into four different types of labor market status (permanent private jobs, permanent public jobs,
temporary jobs, and nonemployment). We are thus able to capture the endogeneity of job choice,
and the relation between this allocation process and individual perceptions of job security.
We have five main findings. First, after controlling for selection, workers feel most secure
in permanent public jobs, and least secure in temporary jobs. While this may sound intuitive,
it nonetheless provides some support for the idea that subjective measures of job security predict
“objective” job security. Put differently, workers’ assessments about their job security are “correct”.
Second, job security in permanent private and temporary jobs is positively correlated with UIB
generosity across countries.
Third, in permanent private and temporary jobs, workers in countries with higher EPL actually
feel less secure. While care needs to be taken in establishing the causality of these correlations, this
third result suggests that job protection is not the best response to the problem—real or supposed
(see OECD, 1997)—of job insecurity.
Fourth, public sector jobs are largely considered to be the most secure, and the correlation of
job security with UIB or EPL in this sector is essentially zero. Public sector jobs are by and large
perceived to be insulated from labor market fluctuations.
Fifth, the gap in perceived job security between public sector and other job types, which can
be interpreted as the “job security returns to being an insider”, increases with EPL strictness and
falls with UIB generosity. This squares in well with the basic message of the political economy
3
literature briefly mentioned above.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some issues relating to the measurement
of job security perceptions using subjective data, and briefly describes the ECHP data that we
use. Section 3 contains a brief review of the related empirical literature, and makes a first pass
at examining the correlations between job security and labor market policy indicators. Section
4 presents our main statistical model, discusses endogeneity issues and explains the estimation
protocol. In section 5 we present the estimation results in two parts: first we analyze the individual
determinants of job insecurity and the selection of workers into various employment states; and,
second, we focus specifically on the relationship between labor market institutions and job security.
The interpretation of the results is discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 offers some concluding
remarks.
2 Measuring perceptions of job security
In this first section we argue that our understanding of the way in which individuals are affected
by labor market institutions such as employment protection or unemployment insurance can be
enhanced by subjective data on job security, which appear in a number of different large-scale
surveys. We first discuss the forms that these questions most commonly take, then we describe the
particular data used in this paper.
2.1 The wording of job security questions
Survey questions on job security typically appear in two broad forms. Most commonly, individ-
uals are asked to report their degree of satisfaction with respect to their job security. A typical
“satisfaction” formulation would be: “How satisfied are you with your present job or business in
terms of job security?” followed by a verbal scale such as “Very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, ...”
and so on. This formulation renders the interpretation of the resulting measure of job (in)security
somewhat problematic. First, it contains an important subjective element (the meaning of “satis-
fied” or even “job security” may vary from one person to another). As such, it is not immediately
obvious that they can be usefully compared across individuals or countries. Second, it confounds
4
the respondent’s perception of at least two very different components of job security, namely the
probability of job loss and the cost of job loss.
An alternative to the above “satisfaction” formulation is the use of a “probabilistic” question,
i.e. to ask individuals about the probability of losing their job. Here a typical wording would be:6
“What do you think is the percent chance that you will lose your job during the next 12 months?”.
Probabilistic questions are more immune to the “confounded issues” criticism. As such, their use is
advocated in a number of recent contributions (Dominitz and Manski, 1996; Manski and Straub,
1999).
Our primary objective in this paper is to explore the relationship between perceived job secu-
rity and labor market institutions; for the latter we specifically consider Employment Protection
Legislation (EPL) or Unemployment Insurance Benefits (UIB). Since these institutions are typi-
cally defined at the national level (and are measured by indicators showing little if any time-series
variation), we obviously need a multi-country data set. In the following we thus use a subsam-
ple of data from the European Community Household Panel survey (ECHP), which is a panel
of individual data gathered by EUROSTAT covering fifteen EU countries in total. One decisive
advantage of the ECHP data is that there is ex ante harmonization of the questionnaire between
countries. Apart from the traditional variables found in national household surveys (demographic
characteristics, income, health, housing, and so on), the ECHP contains a number of “sociologi-
cal” questions regarding personal relationships and outside work activities, as well as a number of
satisfaction questions. Included in these latter is a question on satisfaction with job security. The
exact wording is as follows:7
Question: “How satisfied are you with your present job or business in terms of job
security? Using the scale 1 to 6, please indicate your degree of satisfaction. Position 1
means that you are not satisfied at all, and 6 that you are fully satisfied.”
6As used in the US Survey of Economic Expectations (Dominitz and Manski,1996; Manski and Straub, 1999) and
in the US General Social Survey (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1999).
7The ECHP User Data Base manual only provides the wording in English. At this point we have no way of
assessing possible differences in the question’s formulation across countries resulting from translation.
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Clearly, this is not a probabilistic question and is therefore exposed to both the “interpersonal
comparability” and the “confounded issues” criticisms discussed above. We shall try to (at least
partially) deal with the former by allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity in our statistical
analysis below. It is important to bear the latter in mind when interpreting the results. Specifically,
our general approach will be to interpret the replies to the question above as proxy measures of the
workers’ subjective assessment of the expected change in utility associated with job loss multiplied
by the (subjective) probability of that loss.8 This interpretation has the advantage of explicitly
acknowledging the “confounded issues” issue in a natural and convenient way. The use of a pure
probabilistic question would be a useful complement to the current analysis; unfortunately, we
know of no multi-country panel including this information.
2.2 (Brief) sample description
Returning to our sample, due to missing data we are only able to use twelve of the fifteen countries
and the last five (out of eight) ECHP waves. Moreover, for reasons that we shall briefly discuss
below, we focus on men. Our final sample consists of male workers aged between 20 and 55 in 1997,
who are observed to be either wage earners or nonemployed at every annual interview between
1997 and 2001: we have information on 12,091 individuals × 5 waves; the country distribution of
observations is described in data Appendix A.
Obviously, the above job satisfaction question was only asked of currently-employed individuals.
Figure 1 shows per-country histogram plots of the distribution of replies to the job security question
(among employed wage earners).
Concerning those distributions, note first that, as is often the case with such satisfaction scales,
the responses at the bottom of the distribution (1 and 2) were given only infrequently. This is
8Formally, consider some employed worker i answering the job security question at date t. Denote worker i’s
expected lifetime utility from job continuation at date t by V Eit , the same worker’s expected lifetime utility from
being dismissed at date t by V Uit , and finally denote worker i’s perceived probability of job loss at date t (say, within
the year following the interview) by qit. Then our proposed interpretation of worker i’s response to the job insecurity
question is as a measure of qit ·
 
V Eit − V Uit

.
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a standard and well-documented feature of job satisfaction data. Second, it clearly appears that
individuals’ feelings about job security differ from country to country. It will be our purpose for
the rest of this paper to describe those differences.
3 Job security and job protection: a first pass
In this section we highlight simple correlations between reported job security and a number of
individual characteristics and indicators of labor market institutions. In particular, it seems natural
to ask whether EPL on one hand, and UIB on the other, play a role in attenuating feelings of
insecurity. We begin with basic bivariate correlations between job security and job protection; we
then investigate the role of observed individual heterogeneity.
3.1 A raw measure of job security
A first naive indicator of job security in each country can be constructed from the country-level
mean response to the question described above.9 In this paragraph we ask the following two simple
questions. First, how do our 12 countries compare in terms of this raw indicator? Second, is the
level of job insecurity revealed by these indices correlated with the labor market institutions in the
different countries in our sample?
The answers to both of these questions are contained in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 plots the 1998
OECD indicator of employment protection (x-axis) against our measure of job security (y-axis);
Figure 3 repeats the exercise with the 2000 OECD index of Unemployment Insurance generosity.10
9An alternative would be to use the per-country percentage of replies above a certain cutoff (e.g. the percentage
of respondents saying they are either “satisfied” or “very satisfied”.) Such alternative indicators lead to the same
qualitative conclusions as the country-level mean that we are using in this paragraph.
10The OECD has various indicators of UIB generosity. The one that we are using takes the form of an average
net replacement rate combining a variety of typical individual cases. One important drawback of this indicator is
its failure to take into account the criteria governing eligibility for Unemployment Insurance. Since these criteria
vary widely across countries, this is potentially problematic. Alternatively, we could use average UI expenditures per
unemployed person, which are arguably more complete measures of UIB generosity. We choose average replacement
rates because there is a mechanical negative correlation between mean UI expenditures per unemployed and the
unemployment rate, which is in turn likely to be negatively correlated with job security for reasons that we discuss
below. This mechanical correlation may thus cause an artificial positive correlation between mean UI expenditures
and job security. Nevertheless, the following analysis can be carried out using either measure. The results obtained
7
First, looking at the vertical scales on both Figures, we obtain a job security ranking of the 12
countries in our sample. The basic picture is of workers in “Southern” countries (Portugal, Italy,
France, Spain and Greece) feeling less secure than their counterparts in Northern countries (the
Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland, with the most secure country being Austria). Workers in the
United Kingdom also occupy a fairly low position in this ranking.
Second, Figure 2 strongly suggests a negative correlation between job security and job protec-
tion: at first blush, workers in countries with stricter EPL feel less secure in their jobs. Conversely,
Figure 3 suggests—somewhat less strongly11—that workers in countries with more generous UIB
feel more secure in their jobs.
Those two bivariate conclusions are however a priori fragile, as job security doubtless depends
on any number of (observed or unobserved) individual, job or labor market characteristics. Such
differences are unlikely to be orthogonal to the degree of EPL or to UIB generosity: for example, it is
well-known that countries with stricter EPL have a greater proportion of temporary jobs. Holders
of such jobs likely feel less secure (so that, across countries, EPL and insecurity are positively
correlated), but they are not necessarily insecure because of the stricter EPL. Moreover, it is well-
known that UIB generosity and EPL strictness are negatively correlated across European countries.
In the following subsection we partly deal with this objection by controlling for a set of observed
individual and labor market characteristics. The role of unobserved heterogeneity will be explored
in section 4.
3.2 Observed individual heterogeneity
Personal characteristics, labor market conditions and job type. Our first step beyond
simple bivariate analysis is to regress reported job security on a variety of controls, including the
OECD indicators of EPL strictness and UIB generosity. Specifically, we consider the following
using average UI expenditures per unemployed (which are available upon request) are qualitatively similar to those
presented here.
11The correlation is positive, but not statistically significant in a cross-country regression (whereas the slope of
the EPL-security relationship is statistically significant). Concerning Figure 3, the corresponding scatterplot using
average UI expenditures per unemployed as an indicator of UIB generosity is much more impressive. Yet this may
be artificial to some extent—see the preceding footnote.
8
personal characteristics: age and age-squared, education (3 dummies12), marital status, the pres-
ence of children under 15 in the household, an indicator of foreign citizenship, and an indicator of
the existence of a long-term unemployment spell in the recent past.13 We also include the 5-year
average local unemployment rate as an indicator of local labor market conditions.14
Finally, we want to allow for the possibility that holders of different job types have fundamentally
different perceptions of their job security. To this end we distinguish 3 different job types:15
• e = ppriv: employed under a permanent contract in the private sector;
• e = ppub: employed under a permanent contract in the public sector;
• e = temp: employed under a temporary contract.
The observed distribution of individuals across job types and the state-to-state transition matrix
are shown in Appendix A.
Results. Table 1 displays the results from Ordered Probit regressions of perceived job security on
the set of controls that we just described, separately for the three job types defined in the previous
paragraph. The sample is the initial wave (1997) of our panel.16
Table 1 first reports a constant, which is normalized to zero for permanent private sector
employees.17 The constant is not statistically significant for public employees, suggesting that
12Third level education (ISCED 5-7), Second stage of secondary level education (ISCED 3) and less than second
stage of secondary level education (ISCED 0-2). Those dummies are based on the ECHP variable indicating the
“highest level of general or higher education completed” (PT022). The quality and cross-country comparability of
this variable is questionable, but this is the only general education variable available in the ECHP user database.
13In practice we use an indicator of whether the individual has had an unemployment spell of over one year in the
five years prior to 1997 (the first year in our observation window).
14The “local” unemployment rate is constructed using the ECHP data as the proportion of those active in the
labor market who are unemployed (ILO definition) at the NUTS1 regional level.
15One of the main reasons why we focus on males is to limit the number of job states. As expected, a significant
fraction (around 22%) of the female workers present in our intial sample work in part-time jobs (while the corre-
sponding male share is less than 3%). Since part-time jobs have notoriously different “stability” characteristics than
full-time jobs, they should count as distinct job types. Taking them into account would have led us to double the
number of job states, which at this point is computationally very costly.
16Results from subsequent waves are very similar.
17Any ceteris paribus differences in job security are subsumed into this constant. That is, we have imposed equality
of the ancillary cutoff parameters of the Ordered Probit across job types. While admittedly restrictive, this method
facilitates the comparison of job security between job types.
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there is no systematic ceteris paribus difference in perceived job security between employees of the
private and public sectors, at least among permanent job holders. The point estimate for temporary
workers is negative, larger in absolute value and of borderline statistical significance. Hence there
is some mitigated evidence that temporary workers feel less secure than holders of permanent jobs.
The estimated cohort effects for all job types suggest that job security is decreasing and convex
(U-shaped) in age, as is often found in the analysis of subjective well-being measures (Clark, Oswald
and Warr, 1996). We note that, even though the magnitude of the point estimates are roughly
similar across job types, the age variables are statistically insignificant for public sector employees.
Lower-educated workers feel somewhat less secure than their higher-educated counterparts in
all permanent job types, whereas education plays no role in terms of job security for temporary
workers. This may be taken to reflect the generally less favorable conditions of low-skilled labor
markets. Yet these particular results should be taken with some caution, given the arguably poor
quality of the education variable (see footnote 12).
There is evidence that foreign-born workers feel more insecure than natives in permanent pri-
vate jobs, while foreign citizenship is uncorrelated with job security among public or temporary
employees. Neither cohabitation nor the presence of children in the household affect job security in
any systematic way. Conversely, previous experience of long-term unemployment reduces perceived
job security in all types of jobs (although with borderline significance for permanent private sector
employees).
The next result is more striking: as one would expect, the average local unemployment rate
sharply reduces perceived job security in temporary jobs, which are most exposed to the risk of
layoff. The corresponding effect on perceived job security in permanent jobs (public or private)
is positive (albeit insignificant for private jobs). A possible interpretation here is that workers in
a depressed labor market tend to aspire to more “insulated” jobs, which is what permanent jobs,
especially in the public sector, are perceived to be.
Finally, the last two rows in Table 1 report the estimated effects of our policy indices. These
pertain to the main objective of this paper, which is to explore the link between job security and
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labor market policy. The effect of UIB generosity on perceived job security is positive for workers in
all job types. Moreover, all three point estimates are roughly similar in magnitude (slightly larger
for temporary workers). This corroborates the visual impression given by Figure 2. However,
regarding EPL strictness, we find a negative correlation with perceived job security for permanent
private employees (as Figure 1 suggests), essentially zero for temporary job holders, and positive
for permanent public sector employees. This mitigates the conclusion drawn from the negative
bivariate correlation shown in Figure 1, which only survives in multivariate analysis for permanent,
private sector employees.
Discussion. While some of the regression results gathered in Table 1 are either standard or
intuitive, others are puzzling. First, temporary work being the only job type for which education
is uncorrelated with job security is difficult to explain. With temporary workers being objectively
more exposed to the risk of losing their jobs, and with the chances of finding a replacement job being
arguably lower for less-educated workers, one would have expected, if anything, the correlation
between education and job security to be stronger among temporary than permanent workers.
Second, the ranking of job types in terms of the strength of the correlation between job security
and EPL strictness is also somewhat surprising. As temporary jobs are more exposed to the risk of
job loss, we might have expected temporary workers to be most responsive (one way or the other) to
differences in job protection regulations. Last, there is only a very small ceteris paribus job security
difference between job types: the constant term in Table 1 is only negative and weakly significant
for temporary job holders. Given the large differences across job types in “objective” job security
(as measured, for instance, by the year-to-year probability of becoming non-employed—see Table
A2 in the Appendix A), taking this result at face value would suggest that workers are biased in
the assessments they make of their own job security.
While there are likely many potential explanations for those results, we explore in this paper
the role of unobserved individual heterogeneity. Our prior is that the selection of workers into job
types may not be independent of the workers’ (unobserved) general attitude toward job security.
For example, workers who are “worried”—an unobserved psychological trait that partly determines
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the sentiment of job security—may strive to select themselves into objectively “safer” jobs, e.g.
permanent public jobs. Conversely, one could imagine that “low self-confidence”—another potential
unobserved determinant of job security— is a handicap in job search. Consequently, workers with
this trait may end up in “undesirable” job states—typically, temporary jobs or nonemployment—
more often than their more self-confident counterparts. In either case, the results presented in
Table 1 will partly pick up selection effects. Finally, because the job security question was only
asked to workers holding a job at the time of the interview, the sample on which Table 1 estimates
are based is itself a selected sample. It excludes all the nonemployed, a population likely to have
different attitudes toward job security.
Our task in the remainder of this paper will be to exploit the longitudinal dimension of the
data to try to account for all those selection problems. Before we proceed, however, we conclude
this section with a quick review of the related results obtained by earlier contributions.
3.3 Related literature
This paper is not the first to consider the relationship between subjective measures of job security
on the one hand, and institutional features of the labor market on the other. The bivariate analysis
in OECD (1997) reveals no correlation between insecurity and EPL, but a negative correlation
between insecurity and the replacement rate. More recent analysis has pointed to a seemingly
aberrant positive bivariate relationship between job insecurity and EPL strictness. Bo¨ckerman
(2004) uses data from 16 European countries in the 1998 “Employment Options for the Future”
survey, and reveals a positive correlation between job insecurity and EPL, and a negative correlation
with the replacement rate. Postel-Vinay and Saint-Martin (2004) find similar correlations using
three different job security questions from 2 different data sources—wave 6 of the ECHP and the
1997 “Work Orientations II” wave of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). A recent
paper with a somewhat different aim is Deloffre and Rioux (2003), who use data on eleven countries
from one wave of the ECHP (1999) to examine the role of (endogenously chosen) contract type,
and to assess whether employees’ evaluations of their job security are “correct”. Finally, Boeri et
al.(2001) analyze unique, one-time survey data in which 5,500 citizens from France, Germany, Italy
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and Spain were asked (inter alia) a series of questions about the extent to which they would be
willing to pay for more generous unemployment insurance. One of the onclusions reached by these
authors is that proposals to increase UIB generosity find more support in countries offering both
less generous UIB and more stringent EPL. More generally, Di Tella et al. (2003) show that life
satisfaction is positively correlated with the replacement rate.
Our contribution in this paper is to add to this literature by distinguishing between job security
in different kinds of jobs, and by taking seriously the possibility of endogenous choice of sector by
workers.
4 A statistical model of job security
In this section we present the complete statistical framework that we use to analyze job security.
Here we take a two-step approach, similar in spirit to (e.g.) Eckstein and Wolpin (1999). In a
first step we decompose job security (as measured by the replies to the aforementioned question)
into a component capturing the effects of time-varying local and aggregate labor market conditions
and another component measuring each individual’s “long-run” perception of job security given
job characteristics. In a second step, we propose a statistical decomposition of these estimated
individual measures of job security into permanent, observed and unobserved individual/job/labor
market characteristics, with special interest in the role of country-level EPL and UIB indicators in
explaining individual perceptions of job security.
4.1 Step 1: A decomposition of job security
The job security equation. Let s∗it designate perceived job security for individual i at date t.
We first decompose s∗it as:
s∗it = x
′
itβ +
∑
e∈E
ϕei1eit=e + uit, (1)
where the notation is the following. First, xit includes year dummies and date t local labor market
conditions.18 Second, eit is the individual’s job type—or job state—at date t. We consistently use
18As summarized by the local unemployment rate at date t (see subsection 3.2 above for a definition), taken as a
deviation from its mean value over the five-year observation period. We shall return later to the reason why we use
deviations from mean values here.
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the notation 1eit=e = 1 if individual i is in a job type e at date t. We distinguish the three job types
described in subsection 3.2, plus a fourth corresponding to non-employment (denoted e = none).
In terms of equation (1)’s notation, E = {ppriv,ppub, temp} is the set of job states in which the
idea of job security is meaningful—that is, all states bar non-employment. We thus allow for indi-
vidual differences in the effect of job statuses on perceived job security: individual random effects
ϕei capture the influence on perceived job security in a particular job type e of all time-invariant, ob-
served and unobserved individual heterogeneity variables. Our step 2 below will conduct a detailed
exploration of the determinants of these random effects. For now, we let ϕi =
(
ϕ
ppriv
i , ϕ
ppub
i , ϕ
temp
i
)′
denote the vector of labor market status/individual effects. Finally, uit ∼ N (0, 1) is an i.i.d. error
term, independent of the regressors and the individual effects.
Equation (1) thus decomposes s∗it into a first component x
′
itβ which captures the effects of
temporary variations in local and aggregate labor market conditions, plus a second component
ϕeiti that captures the “permanent” (individual) impact on perceived job security of holding a
particular job type eit. Implicit in equation (1) is the assumption that the former component is
“objective”—i.e. common to all workers—, while the latter is “subjective”, so that the ϕei ’s are
individual-specific.
The job security equation (1) implies that the conditional distribution of reported job security sit
given the explanatory variables (xit, eit, ϕi) is the standard Ordered Probit. Defining the thresholds
−∞ = τ0 < τ1 < . . . < τ6 = +∞ such that sit = h⇔ τh−1 ≤ s
∗
it < τh, we obtain:
Pr (sit = h|xit, eit, ϕi; Θ) =∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
N
(
τh − x
′
itβ −
∑
e∈E
ϕei1eit=e
)
−N
(
τh−1 − x
′
itβ −
∑
e∈E
ϕei1eit=e
)
if eit ∈ E ,
1 if eit = none.
(2)
where Θ denotes the entire set of parameters and N (·) denotes the c.d.f. of the standard normal
distribution. The only subtlety here is that sit is only observed when the individual is employed,
i.e. if eit ∈ E .
14
The selection of workers into employment states. Our interpretation of the individual
effect ϕi in equations (1) and (2) is that it partly captures psychological traits reflecting the taste
or aversion for specific employment states. For instance, individuals with lower values of the ϕtempi
component of ϕi particularly dislike or fear the idea of being employed under temporary contracts
and are thus likely to try and select themselves away from temporary jobs. We thus face a potential
endogeneity problem in that ϕi is likely correlated with the observed employment state eit.
The strategy we adopt is to model state-to-state transitions by a simple first-order Markov
process in which the transition probabilities from an initial employment state ℓ are individual-
specific:
Pr (eit = j|eit−1 = ℓ,Mi; Θ) =Mi (j, ℓ) , (3)
where Mi (j, ℓ) is the (j, ℓ) element of individual i’s 4 × 4 (unobserved) transition matrix Mi.
The matrix Mi itself is treated as another individual random effect, which we shall allow to be
correlated with ϕi in order to capture the potential selection of specific worker types into specific
job types as evoked above.19
Individual likelihood contributions. It may clarify matters at this point to write down indi-
vidual i’s contribution to the sample likelihood. A typical observation is a set:
Xi = {
−→s i,
−→x i,
−→e i} ,
where −→s i = (si1, . . . , siT ),
−→x i = (xi1, . . . , xiT ) and
−→e i = (ei1, . . . , eiT ) (individuals are observed for
T = 5 periods).
Appending the missing unobserved heterogeneity variables to the observed data Xi, we obtain
the complete data {Xi, ϕi,Mi}. The contribution of individual i to the complete likelihood is a
function of the parameters Θ and the complete data, Lci (Θ;Xi, ϕi,Mi), which can be factored as
19Having specified the process governing individual state-to-state transitions, we are left with the usual initial
conditions problem, i.e. we have to model the marginal distribution of individual i’s initial state, ei1. This distribution
depends on the same heterogeneity parameter as the transition process: Pr (ei1 = j|Mi; Θ) = π
1
Mi
(j). Another
possible approach (advocated by Wooldridge, 2002), is to condition the whole problem on the individual’s initial
state, ei1.
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follows:
Lci (Θ;Xi, ϕi,Mi) =
1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pr (−→s i|
−→x i,
−→e i, ϕi; Θ)
× [Pr (−→e i|ei1,Mi; Θ)× Pr (ei1|Mi; Θ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
× Pr (ϕi,Mi|Θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
× Pr (−→x i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
. (4)
The right hand side of (4) is a product of four terms. The first is the joint conditional probability
of the sequence of reported job security values. This can be derived from the job security equation
(1), as in equation (2). The second term is the joint conditional probability of the sequence of
employment states in which individual i is observed. This joint probability is simply a product of
the transition probabilities given by (3), for all dates t ≥ 2, multiplied by the marginal probability
of the initial state ei1 (see footnote 19). The fourth and last term is independent of the parameters
and can be ignored. With respect to this fourth term, however, we should underline an important
assumption made implicitly in (4), which is that −→x i is independent of (ϕi,Mi). This assumption
is important for step 2 of our estimation procedure, which we will discuss at the end of sub-section
4.2.
We are left with the third term to model, i.e. the joint distribution of the unobserved hetero-
geneity (ϕi,Mi). This is the subject of the next paragraph.
Unobserved individual heterogeneity. The last part of the model that we have to specify
is the joint distribution of individual random effects, Pr (ϕi,Mi|Θ). Here we use a finite mixture
approach and assume that individual i belongs to one ofK classes of individuals, where all members
of a given class k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} share the same value (ϕk,Mk) of the various unobserved individual
effects. Formally, we model (ϕi,Mi) as
ϕi =
K∑
k=1
ϕk × 1ki=k, Mi =
K∑
k=1
Mk × 1ki=k, (5)
where ki is the unobserved class index of individual i. The joint distribution of (ϕi,Mi) is thus
entirely characterized by that of ki, i.e. the distribution of individuals into classes. The latter has
K points of support. The class probabilities Pr (ki = k|Θ) = pk form a set of K − 1 parameters to
be estimated.
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Estimation. With the above set of assumptions, the individual contribution to the complete
likelihood (4) simplifies into:20
Lci (Θ;Xi, ki) = Pr (si1|xi1, ei1, ki; Θ)× Pr (ei1|ki; Θ)
×
T∏
t=2
[Pr (sit|xit, eit, ki; Θ)× Pr (eit|eit−1, ki; Θ)]× Pr (ki|Θ)× Pr (
−→x i) . (6)
Now, since ki is unobserved, we have to integrate it out of the likelihood function and maximize
the sample log-likelihood:
lnL (Θ;X) =
N∑
i=1
ln
[
K∑
k=1
Lci (Θ;Xi, k)
]
, (7)
where X = {Xi}
N
i=1 denotes the set of N individual observations in the sample. We carry out this
maximization using a version of the EM algorithm described in Appendix B. Finally, standard
errors are computed using the delta method.
4.2 Step 2: Analysis of job security indicators
Objectives. The individual/job type effects ϕi in our job security equation (1) reflect the impact
of all permanent individual characteristics—observed or otherwise—on perceived job security across
different job types. For instance, the subjective “cost” of having a temporary relative to a permanent
job may vary from one individual to another as a function of unobserved psychological traits such
as risk aversion. It may also be the case that the effect of temporary and permanent contracts on
perceived job security depends on observed individual characteristics such as how distinct temporary
and permanent contracts really are from the individual’s viewpoint, which in turn depends on the
particular legislation framing the use of temporary contracts in the individual’s country of residence.
Here we will highlight the correlations between ϕi, which we take as a “filtered” indicator of job
security, and a set of covariates.
Construction of summary indicators of job security. We require a predictor of ϕi for each
individual i in the sample. As a preliminary step in the construction of this predictor, we first
20Given a set of parameter values, our discrete factor model implies that the complete data {Xi, ϕi,Mi} is fully
characterized by the set {Xi, ki}, as the individual effects (ϕi,Mi) are fully characterized by individual class indices
and parameter values.
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compute the posterior probability that an individual i belongs to class k given the data Xi for this
individual and our set of parameter estimates, Θ̂. Using the notation introduced in step 1, this
probability is given by:
Pr
(
ki = k|Xi; Θ̂
)
=
Lci
(
Θ̂;Xi, k
)
∑K
ℓ=1 L
c
i
(
Θ̂;Xi, ℓ
) . (8)
It turns out that these probabilities are in fact by-products of the EM algorithm that we use in the
estimation procedure of step 1 (see Appendix B).
With these probabilities in hand, we construct a predictor of ϕi by simply taking the expectation
of ϕk using the individual-specific class weights defined in (8):
ϕ̂i = EPr(k|Xi;bΘ)ϕk =
K∑
k=1
[
ϕk · Pr
(
ki = k|Xi; Θ̂
)]
. (9)
Note that this predictor ϕ̂i is a weighted average of all points in the support of the random effect
ϕk. Because this support is discrete, the predictor ϕ̂i defined in (9) will not be one of the support
points. While this may feel disturbing, one has to bear in mind that using ϕ̂i in the forthcoming
analysis is equivalent to using a “simulation” approach where one (or any number of) realization(s)
ϕ
bki
of the random effect is attributed to each individual i by drawing one (or any number of)
realization(s) of individual i’s class k̂i from the distribution (8).
21
We thus obtain a 3-dimensional vector of state-specific indicators of subjective job security:
ϕ̂i =
(
ϕ̂
ppriv
i , ϕ̂
ppub
i , ϕ̂
temp
i
)′
, (10)
where each component of the vector corresponds to a particular job type in E .
Explaining job security. We now turn to our statistical decomposition of the individual com-
ponents of perceived job security. The basic idea that we pursue is to run OLS regressions of the
21Obviously, this method for obtaining a predictor of the individual job security random effect is not the only one
imaginable. For instance, an alternative option would consist in predicting individual i’s class bki by minimizing the
mean squared prediction error as follows:
bki = argmin
k∈{1,...,K}
K
X
ℓ=1

Pr

ki = ℓ|Xi; bΘ

‖ϕℓ − ϕk‖
2

,
and then using bϕi = ϕ
bki
as a predictor. The results with this alternative method are extremely similar to those
presented here.
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form:
ϕ̂ei = z
′
iα
e + vei (11)
for each separate job state e ∈ E , where zi is a vector of permanent characteristics of the individual,
the individual’s job and her particular labor market. Most importantly, zi includes country-level
policy indicators. We describe the exact specifications that we use below, as we discuss the esti-
mated values of αe.
Before we consider the estimation results, we should make three important remarks about this
last step of our analysis in which we run regressions of the form (11).
First, in terms of the interpretation of the regression results, it may be useful to emphasize that
this method merely provides a descriptive decomposition of individual perceived job security ϕ̂i
into an observed heterogeneity component—the z′iα
e’s—and an orthogonal residual component—
the vei ’s. While it may be natural to think of perceived job security ϕi as a function of the zi’s
and some unobserved heterogeneity variable, say εi, this function is fundamentally unidentified.
Our goal here is to provide an intuitive description of job security data rather than to estimate a
structural model of job security.
Second, the likelihood functions from step 1—see equations (4) and (6)—were written under the
implicit assumption thatXi = {
−→s i,
−→x i,
−→e i} is independent of zi conditional on ki (or conditional on
the pair (ϕi, ψi)). Moreover, as we already emphasized in the previous sub-section, those likelihood
functions also contain the assumption that −→x i ⊥ ki. The combination of these two assumptions
implies independence of −→x i and zi. At this point, recall that
−→x i contains indicators of regional
labor market conditions. Since zi typically contains country-level policy indicators, the assumption
that −→x i ⊥ zi may sound a bit heroic. To attenuate this criticism, we only include temporary
variations in local labor market conditions in the vector of explanatory variables −→x i so that
−→x i
may be considered orthogonal to the country dummies (specifically, −→x i contains year dummies,
and the regional unemployment rate taken in deviations from its 5-year mean value rather than
the level of the regional unemployment rate—see footnote 18). Permanent labor market conditions
(as captured by the 5-year mean regional unemployment rate) are then included in the zi variables.
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Last, the dependent variables ϕ̂ei in regressions (11) are affected by prediction errors. These
render the computation of the standard errors on αe difficult. Proper computation of those standard
errors would involve running many bootstrap replications of our step 1, which is computationally
too costly to consider undertaking on a PC. In the implementation below, we do not account for
those estimation errors, but we note that the reported standard errors are likely underestimated.22
With those three remarks in mind, we now present and discuss the estimation results.
5 Estimation results
In practice we use K = 8 unobserved classes of individuals, each class corresponding to a unique
value of ϕ and M. Eight is the optimal number of classes according to the Normalized Entropy
Criterion (NEC, see Celeux and Soromenho, 1996, and Appendix B ).23
5.1 Step 1
Individual effects. The estimated class probabilities pk appear in Table 2. The estimated values
of the “job security” effect ϕ, which we denote as ϕ1, . . . , ϕ8 are reported in Table 3 for each separate
job state in E . Finally, rather than displaying the 8 transition matricesM1, . . . ,M8 (which would
take up a lot of space), we present the associated invariant probability distributions π∞1 to π
∞
8 in
Table 4. (These distributions are defined over the four employment states by π∞′k ·Mk = π
∞′
k and
measure the long-run probability for a member of class k of being in each particular employment
state.)
22This last problem can be overcome by implementing a slightly different, single-step estimation method. The pros
and cons of various approaches to estimating our model are discussed in Appendix C, where we also motivate our
methodological choice.
23Other commonly used penalized likelihood criteria (AIC, BIC) suggest allowing for even more classes: the
Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) suggests 10 classes, while the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
is still decreasing after 11 classes, which is as much as our computer could handle using the whole sample.(However,
AIC is known to asymptotically overstate the number of classes.) We choose to follow the NEC for 3 reasons: first,
as opposed to more general model selection criteria, it is specifically designed to select the number of classes in a
finite mixture model; second, the computational cost of maximizing the likelihood increases quickly with the number
of classes; and third, beyond 6 classes, increasing the number of classes did not make much qualitative difference to
the results.
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The class probabilities in Table 2 do not require much comment, besides the fact that they are
all well above zero, so that none of the unobserved classes that our estimation procedure detects is
of (probabilistically) negligible size.
Table 3 shows evidence of large-scale individual heterogeneity in job security perceptions. Yet
it is clear that all classes feel less secure about temporary than permanent (public or private) jobs,
bar the a priori puzzling case of class 1 who are somewhat averse to public jobs—feeling just as
secure in temporary jobs and permanent public jobs! This becomes less of a paradox when we note
(as we will see below) that members of class 1 are actually practically never employed in public
sector jobs. Note also that 3 out of 8 classes (numbers 3, 6 and 7) view permanent public and
permanent private jobs as equally secure.
Finally, the last row in Table 3 confirms that, on average, people feel more secure in public
than in private sector jobs, and less secure in temporary than in permanent jobs. This latter series
of results contrast with Table 1, which seemed to imply that ceteris paribus workers’ average job
security perceptions were roughly equal across job types, a result which we described as dubious
given the obvious cross-job type differences in “objective” measures of job security (e.g. the year-
to-year probability of a transition into nonemployment—see Table A2 in Appendix A). Indeed,
Table 3 now suggests that this seeming equality was mostly driven by the selection of workers
into different job types. While those effects differ across classes/individuals—and we shall dwell
on these differences in the next section—, it seems generally true that “social insecurity” concerns
temporary job holders, with public sector employees being relatively insulated. This is not entirely
unexpected. Yet we still take it as a general indication that (1) workers’ perceptions of their own
job security partly reflect their objective condition—i.e. workers make “correct” assessments about
their job security, and (2) workers reporting a low level of satisfaction with their job security really
mean that they wish their job were more (as opposed to less) stable or protected.
Our next task is to consider the allocation of workers into employment states (Table 4). Again
we see clear evidence of heterogeneity across worker classes. For instance, workers in classes 1 and
6 clearly tend to end up massively in permanent private sector jobs, while those from classes 5 and
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7 are attracted to the public sector. Also, some workers (e.g., classes 4 and 8) seem to have trouble
avoiding “undesirable” employment states—namely temporary jobs and nonemployment. This
suggests that the “job security” individual effect ϕi may be determined in part by a psychological
trait which also impacts on individual productivity (either at work or in job search) which in turn
determines the type of jobs to which individuals have access.
Job insecurity and long-run employment states. Finally, we wish to assess the nature
and extent of the potential selection biases that we mentioned in subsection 4.1. This amounts to
analyzing the relationship between the job security random effects and the patterns of allocation
into job states of the various classes.
One way to carry out this analysis is to examine jointly Tables 3 and 4. While this may reveal
some “intuitively consistent” elements of the selection process (such as members of class 1 disliking
public jobs and consistently selecting themselves away from public jobs), it probably does not
provide the most useful summary picture of worker selection. More conveniently, our results allow
us to compute the selection biases defined as follows:
B (e1) = E (ϕ
e1
i |ei = e1)− E (ϕ
e1
i |ei 6= e1) . (12)
This is the gap between average reported job security for a job of type e1 ∈ E as perceived by
workers in employment state e1 and the average job security for that same job type e1 as perceived
by workers who are in an employment state other than e1. Equation (12) thus takes up the familiar
definition of selection biases from the “treatment effects” literature.24
The vector B is shown in Table 5 for the 3 fixed effect values ϕppriv, ϕppub and ϕtempi , and
the 3 relevant conditioning employment states “ppriv”, “ppub” and “temp”. We first note that
24The long-run version of (12) can be expressed as a function of the numbers reported in Tables 2 to 4:
B (e1) =
KX
k=1
 
ϕ
e1
k
pkπ
∞
k (e1)
PK
ℓ=1 pℓπ
∞
ℓ (e1)
!
−
KX
k=1
 
ϕe1k
pk [1− π
∞
k (e1)]
1−
PK
ℓ=1 pℓπ
∞
ℓ (e1)
!
,
where pkπ
∞
k (e1) /
PK
ℓ=1 pℓπ
∞
ℓ (e1) (resp. pk [1− π
∞
k (e1)] /
h
1−
PK
ℓ=1 pℓπ
∞
ℓ (e1)
i
) is the probability of belonging to
class k conditional on being in employment state e1 (resp. in an employment state other than e1).
selection biases are fairly large: their magnitude is comparable to the differences across job states
of the levels of the effects themselves (see Table 3). Next, looking at the signs of the three terms
of Table 5, there is positive selection into permanent jobs. For instance, workers in permanent,
private jobs feel more secure about permanent private jobs than workers in other employment
states: B (ppriv) > 0. Likewise, B (ppub) > 0. While these conform with simple intuition, the
negative sign of the third term is more puzzling. B (temp) < 0, meaning that temporary job
holders tend to be more temporary job-averse (in terms of security) than the average worker in
other employment states. This again suggests that the allocation process of workers into job states
is not entirely governed by workers’ free choices based on their taste for particular job types: choices
are constrained to some extent, even in the long-run.
We now turn back to our central equation of interest, equation (1). We begin by analyzing the
impact of labor market conditions on job security.
Labor market conditions. The estimated coefficients on the observed time-varying covariates
xit (the β’s in equation (1)) appear in Table 6.
25 Recall our proposed interpretation of latent job
security s∗it as a compound of the perceived utility cost of job loss and the subjective probability
of that loss. The covariates entering the right hand side of equation (1) potentially impact both
components of perceived job security.
The estimated coefficients on the year dummies suggest that job security tends to follow the
cycle—with 1998 to 2000 being somewhat more “secure” years. There is no sign of a time trend;
this is not unexpected, given that interviewees are asked to report their job security measured on
a fixed 1-6 scale. A higher-than-normal local unemployment rate unsurprisingly tends to make
workers more worried. Temporarily high local unemployment rates reflect bad local labor market
conditions and thus indicate how easy or difficult it would be to find a new job in the case of
dismissal.
25We do not report the cutoff points τh. Those are available upon request, together with their standard errors.
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5.2 Step 2
Job security and individual characteristics. In this final section we present the results of a
series of OLS regressions of the type shown in (11) repeated below for convenience:
ϕ̂ei = z
′
iα
e + vei . (11)
We use the same vector zi of explanatory variables as in subsection 3.2.
26 We run this regression for
the three job types: permanent private (ppriv), permanent public (ppub), and temporary (temp).
The results of this series of regressions are shown in Table 7. They may be usefully compared to
the results of the simple regression ignoring selection issues (see Table 1, subsection 3.2). In this
paragraph we shall highlight the salient differences between the two series of results: as we shall
see, our treatment of unobserved heterogeneity improves on the results from Table 1 by making
them generally more clear-cut and intuitive.
As in Table 1, the cohort effects suggest that job security is U-shaped in age. The point
estimates and standard errors are now similar across job types. The effects of education are also
similar, though somewhat starker here than in Table 1: low-educated workers now feel less secure
about all job types (the effect is now strongest for temporary jobs) than workers with high or
intermediate levels of education, the latter two feeling roughly equally secure.
In contrast to the inconclusive results of Table 1, there is now evidence that foreign workers
feel more insecure than natives in all types of jobs. However, compared to the significantly and
substantially negative coefficients found for private and temporary jobs, the estimated coefficient
in the public sector job regression is smaller in magnitude by about a half and of weak statistical
significance.
26This includes age and age-squared, education (3 dummies), marital status, the presence of children under 15 in
the household, an indicator of foreign citizenship, an indicator of the existence of a long-term unemployment spell in
the recent past, the 5-year average local unemployment rate, and the OECD indicators of EPL strictness and UIB
generosity.
Moreover, we should recall that the regressions in this section do not account for the estimation errors that affect the
dependent variables bϕ
e
i . So again, the standard errors that we report for step 2 regressions are probably understated
and all the ensuing considerations about statistical inference are only indicative.
.
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There is also weak evidence that living in a couple affects job security positively, and that
having children in the household makes men feel more insecure about private and temporary jobs.
Neither of these effects was found in Table 1. These can be interpreted as an indication of family
insurance: having children makes job loss more costly, while the presence of a spouse who can fulfill
the role of second breadwinner alleviates insecurity. Moreover, interestingly, the effect of having
children in the household vanishes in public sector jobs.
Past experience of long-term unemployment reduces perceived job security in all types of jobs.
From the point estimates, this effect is around twice as large for temporary jobs than for any of the
permanent job types. We also find a negative correlation between the average local unemployment
rate and perceived job security in permanent private and temporary jobs (with a somewhat stronger
effect for temporary jobs). But its effect on perceived job security in public jobs is strongly positive
(and not very precisely estimated). These particular results are qualitatively similar—but again
more clear cut—to those found in Table 1. Our tentative interpretation that workers facing adverse
labor market conditions would wish to have more protected jobs continues to hold.
Table 7 also reports a constant (first row), the values of which show the job security ranking
of job types: temporary job holders feel less secure than permanent, private job holders, while
those in permanent public jobs feel more secure. This statement is based on point estimates
and the relatively large standard errors affecting the corresponding coefficients make it likely that
the ceteris paribus differences in job security across job types are of weak statistical significance.
However, this implicit security ranking of job types is more intuitive than that obtained from Table
1, a difference which may be taken to confirm the importance of selection effects.
At this point, the picture that Table 7 sketches is that, while the perception of job security for
either permanent private or temporary jobs varies significantly with local labor market conditions,
recent unemployment experience, citizenship, and to some extent with family status, these controls
only appear statistically insignificantly or with much reduced power in the regression (11) for ϕppub
(i.e., in the public sector). Compared to private or temporary jobs, public jobs are thus perceived
to be safe, and insulated from labor market shocks.
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Job security and policy. Finally, the last two rows of Table 7 report the estimated effects of
our indicators of EPL strictness and UIB generosity. The results are striking. We first see that
correlation between job security and EPL is negative and significant , while that with UIB is positive
and significant. This holds in both temporary and permanent, private jobs, thus confirming the
visual impression given by Figures 2 and 3. For public jobs, however, perceived job security is
essentially uncorrelated with the stringency of EPL, and is only very weakly positively correlated
with the generosity of UIB (the estimated coefficient on the latter indicator is smaller in magnitude
by a factor of 5 to 8 compared to that in the private and temporary job regressions, and its statistical
significance is borderline). Hence, again, public sector jobs are perceived as being largely insulated
from the risk of job loss.
A closer look at the numbers further reveals that, while perceived job security in temporary
and permanent private jobs are roughly equally sensitive to EPL, unemployment compensation is
relatively more important for temporary (relative to permanent) jobs. The estimated coefficient on
the UIB indicator is about 60 percent larger in magnitude in the temporary than in the permanent
private job regression.
At this point it thus seems safe to conclude that male workers holding either a temporary or
a permanent, private job feel more secure in countries with generous UIB but relatively low EPL
(at least as measured by the OECD indicators). Neither composition effects—due to demographic
differences between countries or to particular selection patterns of workers into specific job types,
based on the former’s observed and unobserved individual characteristics—nor the trade-off between
EPL strictness and UIB generosity can explain why workers in countries with stricter EPL and less
generous UIB are more worried about their job security.
6 Interpretation of the results
How should we interpret these correlations between job security, EPL and UIB? In this section we
review some theoretical arguments from two strands of literature: the “macro-labor” literature,
which focuses on the causal effect of institutions on labor market outcomes (job security in partic-
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ular), and the “political economy of institutions” literature, which considers causality running in
the opposite direction.
6.1 The impact of EPL and UIB on job security
Stricter EPL leads to longer unemployment durations, both theoretically and empirically. For
employees, EPL is therefore a double-edged sword: while protecting them by reducing the risk
of job loss, it also increases the associated cost of job loss by reducing the outflow rate from
unemployment. Standard calibrations of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) matching model—the
modern theoretical workhorse of labor market policy scholars—predict that the second phenomenon
is most likely to dominate, and most strongly so for the tier of the labor market that is not subject
to strong firing restrictions—i.e. for temporary jobs—(see e.g. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002, for
an application with both temporary contracts and firing restrictions). One interpretation of the
negative correlations appearing in Table 7 is that these predictions are correct, at least for those
job types that are most obviously exposed to some “objective” risk of job loss—namely temporary
jobs and permanent private jobs. The generosity of UIB, on the other hand, has no evident
cross-country correlation with objective aggregate measures of labor market risk such as mean
job or unemployment spell hazards. As a first approximation, it can thus probably be considered
preferable to EPL as an insurance tool against labor market risk.27 This, at least, is the stated
view of the European council (see the quotation in the Introduction), and Table 7 suggests that
workers, in many cases, share this view.
6.2 Job security as a determinant of institutions
A separate “political economy of institutions” literature inverses the causality running from insti-
tutions to labor market outcomes, and considers the arrow running in the opposite direction.28 A
recurring idea in this latter strand of literature is that it is in the interest of “insiders” to sup-
port strict EPL, while “outsiders” are more likely to favor generous UIB. As Boeri et al. (2001)
27One component of EPL, severance payments, which is a pure transfer from firm to (former) worker, potentially
plays a true insurance role. Yet all other components of EPL (procedural costs, waiting periods, judicial costs) are
deadweight costs for the firm-worker match.
28Saint-Paul (2000, 2002), Boeri et al. (2001) and Boeri et al. (2003) are recent examples addressing the specific
issues of UIB and/or EPL.
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note, “EPL concentrates the unemployment risk among ‘outsiders’”. While our results do not
convey a direct test of this statement, they certainly are consistent with it. To see this, we can
construct a measures of the “individual gain (in terms of job security) to being an insider” as either
ϕ̂
ppub
i −ϕ̂
temp
i or ϕ̂
ppub
i −ϕ̂
ppriv
i and regress these measures on the covariates zi and our country-level
measures of UIB and EPL. The coefficient estimates on these latter two variables are shown in the
first two columns of Table 8, where we see that the gain to being an insider significantly increases
with EPL strictness and significantly decreases with UIB generosity.29
We can further show, however, that this result is sensitive to the fact that we are assimilating
“being an insider” to “holding a permanent, public job”. The differential in perceived job security
between permanent private and temporary contracts, ϕ̂pprivi − ϕ̂
temp
i , appears uncorrelated with
EPL or UIB (see the third column of Table 8).
Up to this latter qualification, our results thus seem broadly consistent with the theoretical
political economy message about who profits and who suffers from a given mix of EPL and UIB.
Yet turning back to the first two columns of Table 7, one sees that those in permanent private jobs—
many of whom may arguably be considered to be “insiders” and who surely constitute a political
majority—feel less secure when facing stricter EPL and less generous UIB.30 This is somewhat
intriguing, particularly if one seeks to understand the emergence of a low UIB-high EPL regime as
a political equilibrium (Boeri et al., 2003).
One, difficult to test, interpretation is that workers suffer from a certain kind of myopia, and
do not take into account the negative effects of EPL on unemployment duration, while instead
concentrating on the (immediate) positive effect on firing. An explanation along similar lines is
over-optimism: while individuals feel bad about others who are potentially harmed when they
29We omit the estimated coefficients on the remaining covariates in zi. They are available upon request. An inter-
esting point to note regarding these coefficients is that the job security gain to being an insider always unambiguously
increases in the face of adverse labor market conditions, as measured by a high local unemployment rate.
30We use a shortcut here. All the type-(11) regressions summarized in Table 7 and 8 were run on the entire
population. Running separate regressions for holders of the various specific job types, or weighting the data by the
individual long-run probabilities of holding specific job types (the π∞k ’s) leads to qualitatively unchanged results.
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lose their jobs, they do not imagine that they themselves will be in that situation. As such, they
overvalue the benefits of EPL relative to the costs.
Another candidate interpretation is that the making of labor market policy escapes the majority
rule. It may indeed generically be the case that the political process is sufficiently biased toward
public sector employees to make it look like they were the political group deciding upon the strict-
ness of employment protection or the generosity of unemployment compensation. How reasonable
such a statement sounds to a layperson probably varies a lot between European societies (as well
as within each society, for that matter). One of the main points that we make here, however, is
that the data do not seem to contain much evidence against it.
A third explanation would dispute that EPL is, on average, bad for workers. The gist of this
argument is that EPL affects security negatively, but some other, unmeasured, aspect(s) of the job
positively. The overall positive impact of EPL on workers’ jobs leads to them being in favor of it.
Alternatively, de jure dismissal restrictions as measured by the EPL index may not translate
to de facto practice. Yet, for job security to rise with EPL would require that de facto and de jure
restrictions be negatively correlated, which seems unlikely. Further, Pierre and Scarpetta (2004)
use international survey data on 17000 firms to show that employers’ concerns about regulations
are closely correlated with the Laws’ de jure stringency.
Last, it may be the case that the degree of job insecurity is a driving force behind the desire
for protection, and that this latter only partially alleviates the problem. A parallel would then
be stronger police presence in high crime areas: it is the latter (ex ante) which determines the
former. The small amount of temporal movement in EPL, and the difficulty of accurately measuring
changes, preclude any analysis of co-movements in security and protection. We suspect, however,
that the endogeneity of institutions may turn out to play a key role in the relationship between
EPL and job security.
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7 Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to the economic policy debate by examining the link between labor market
institutions and job security. We use data from the European Community Household Panel to
construct indicators of perceived job security for 3 different types of job contracts—permanent
private, permanent public, and temporary—in 12 different EU countries. We then examine the
relationship between job security and labor market institutions, specifically employment protection
and unemployment benefit generosity.
The overall conclusions are that perceived job security in non-public sector jobs is lower in
countries with stricter employment protection legislation but higher in countries with more gener-
ous unemployment benefits. These effects are not found for public jobs, which seem to be more
“universally” perceived as safe jobs (i.e. insulated from labor market shocks). These conclusions
hold controlling for composition effects and controlling for sorting by workers into job types.
Our interpretation of these results remains speculative, as we cannot carry out direct tests of
many hypotheses. One key point to bear in mind is that the effect of EPL on job security broadly
defined (including future employment prospects) is theoretically ambiguous. It is also possible that
we have uncovered some kind of a political equilibrium, whereby those who profit from higher EPL
(secure insiders, say) push for more protection, and politicians are responsive to this pressure. It
remains to be explained, however, why this would hold when it appears that the majority of workers
feel less secure in higher EPL/less generous UIB environments.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that employment protection, as measured by the OECD indicator,
does not by itself afford good protection against the feeling of job insecurity, whereas unemploy-
ment benefits do play something of an insurance role. Interestingly, the European Union’s own
observatory on the quality of work makes extensive reference to protection (European Foundation
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2002). However, this is always in the
context of social protection, rather than pure job protection. In this sense, the Danish model of
“flexicurity” may be what workers really want, although they do not necessarily realize it.
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APPENDIX
A Sample description
Construction. The European Panel (ECHP) is a common-questionnaire panel of household and indi-
vidual data gathered by EUROSTAT, covering twelve EU countries over a maximum of eight waves (1994
to 2001).31 The survey was extended to fifteen countries with the later addition of Austria, Finland and
Sweden. Due to missing data, we only use twelve of these fifteen countries, and five of the eight waves: sat-
isfaction with job security was not asked in Germany, Luxembourg or Sweden. Also, there are abnormally
high proportions of non-responses to that question among temporary job holders in France in wave 3.32
It should also be noted that the UK left the ECHP in 1997, and that subsequent data is ex-post
harmonized from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS). It turns out that BHPS data have higher
non-response rates than do ECHP data to the job security question.
Our final sample consists of male workers aged between 20 and 55 in 1997, who are observed to be either
wage earners or nonemployed at every yearly interview between 1997 and 2001. Individuals who were self-
employed in at least one year during our observation window were left out of the sample, as were individuals
consistently reporting nonparticipation. We thus end up with 12,091 individuals × 5 waves, the country
distribution of which is described in Table A1.
< Table A1 about here. >
Job security. The job security variable is known as item PE032 in the ECHP user data base. The exact
wording of that question and the per-country distribution of replies are presented in the main text. We note
that this question comes second in a series of 7 job satisfaction questions that appear in the “employment”
section of the questionnaire. It turns out that the responses to many of these satisfaction questions are
highly correlated.
Job mobility. Individual i’s employment state at date t is denoted by eit. We distinguish four employ-
ment states: employed in the private sector with a permanent contract (eit = ppriv); employed in the public
sector with a permanent contract (eit = ppub); employed with a temporary contract (eit = temp);
33 and
nonemployed (eit = none). Note that all the information used to construct the state indicator eit is reported
by the individual. In particular, the definition of “temporary contract” is somewhat arbitrary and can vary
from one individual to the other.
31Details on the ECHP are available at the European Panel Analysis Group (EPAG) website
(http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/epag/user-network.php).
32Similar problems appear to a lesser extent in the U.K. data in waves 7 and 8. Moreover, the contract type (short
vs. long term) is largely missing in Portugal in wave 7. These latter problems can be fixed to a great extent by
bringing missing information over from adjacent waves.
33In principle we could have split further between temporary, private and temporary, public. However, this raises
considerable computational difficulties due to the scarcity of transitions from, e.g. permanent, public jobs to tempo-
rary, private jobs.
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< Figure A1 and Table A2 about here. >
The distribution of individuals across states, and the matrix of observed transitions are displayed in
Figure A1 and Table A2, respectively.
B The EM algorithm
In this Appendix we briefly describe our application of the EM algorithm for finite mixtures. For a general
presentation see Dempster et al. (1977), or Bilmes (1998) for an excellent applied tutorial. The algorithm
goes through the following two steps:
1. Expectation (E)-step. Given starting values of the parameters Θ0, we first update the mixing
proportions which are equal to the posterior joint density of k conditional on the observables Xi:
Pr (ki = k|Xi; Θ0) =
Lci (Θ0;Xi, k)∑K
ℓ=1 L
c
i (Θ0;Xi, ℓ)
. (13)
We then use those mixing proportions to compute the expected value of individual i’s contribution to
the sample log-likelihood, given our initial parameter value Θ0:
E [lnLci (Θ;X
c
i ) |Xi; Θ0] =
K∑
k=1
Pr (ki = k|Xi; Θ0)× lnL
c
i (Θ;Xi, k) . (14)
2. Maximization (M)-step. The M-step simply consists in maximizing the expected sample log likeli-
hood, given the starting parameter values Θ0:
Θ̂|Θ0 = argmax
Θ
N∑
i=1
E [lnLci (Θ;X
c
i ) |Xi; Θ0] (15)
= argmax
Θ
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Pr (ki = k|Xi; Θ0)× lnL
c
i (Θ;Xi, k) . (16)
This delivers an updated set of parameter estimates, Θ̂|Θ0 , which we then use as new starting values
in the E-step.
In our application, using equations (2) to (6), individual i’s contribution to the complete log-likelihood
can be written as the following function of the parameters:
lnLci (Θ;Xi, ki) =
T∑
t=1
ln
(
N
[
τh − x
′
itβ − ϕ
eit
ki
]
−N
[
τh−1 − x
′
itβ − ϕ
eit
ki
])
+ lnπ1ki (ei1) +
T∑
t=2
lnMki (eit, eit−1) + ln pki . (17)
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Given our set of initial parameters Θ0, we first compute the mixing proportions using (13) and (17). We
then maximize
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Pr (ki = k|Xi; Θ0)×
(
T∑
t=1
ln
(
N
[
τh − x
′
itβ − ϕ
eit
ki
]
−N
[
τh−1 − x
′
itβ − ϕ
eit
ki
])
+ lnπ1k (ei1) +
T∑
t=2
lnMk (eit, eit−1) + ln pk
)
(18)
with respect to Θ =
(
β, ϕ, τ, π1,M,p
)
, where boldface letters designate vectors of parameters (e.g. M =
(Mk)1≤k≤K). This maximization problem is separable to some extent: a first subset of parameters—those
involved in the first line of (18), namely (β, ϕ, τ)—are estimated by running a weighted ordered probit
regression of reported job security −→s i against (
−→x i,
−→e i) and a class index ki according to the job security
equation (1) using the mixing proportions (13) as weights. The complementary subset of parameters—those
involved in the second line of (18), namely
(
π1,M,p
)
—can be obtained in closed form from the relevant
first-order conditions:
π̂1k (e) |Θ0 =
∑N
i=1 [1ei1=e Pr (ki = k|Xi; Θ0)]∑N
i=1 Pr (ki = k|Xi; Θ0)
; (19)
M̂k (j, ℓ) |Θ0 =
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=2
[
1eit−1=ℓ1eit=j Pr (ki = k|Xi; Θ0)
]∑N
i=1
∑T
t=2
[
1eit−1=ℓ Pr (ki = k|Xi; Θ0)
] ; (20)
p̂k|Θ0 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Pr (ki = k|Xi; Θ0) . (21)
At this point, we have an update Θ̂|Θ0 for all the parameters, which we compare with our initial guess, Θ0.
If they are close enough, the algorithm stops, else we start again at the E-step using Θ̂|Θ0 as a new initial
guess.34
Finally, the parsimony criterion used to select the number of classes K is the Normalized Entropy
criterion (NEC) proposed by Celeux and Soromenho (1996), which is given by:
NEC (K) =
−
∑K
k=1
∑N
i=1 Pr
(
ki = k|Xi; Θ̂
∗
K
)
ln
[
Pr
(
ki = k|Xi; Θ̂
∗
K
)]
lnL
(
Θ̂∗K ;X
)
− lnL
(
Θ̂∗
1
;X
) , (22)
where Θ̂∗K is the vector of parameter estimates for a model with K classes. The denominator in the latter
formula is thus the log of the likelihood ratio between the K-class model and the single-class model. In the
case of this paper, NEC (K) is minimized at K = 8.
C Methodological issues
In this Appendix we briefly discuss the pros and cons of our two-step method, vis-a`-vis a more direct, one-step
approach.
34In practice our convergence criterion is that the maximum relative increase among the components of Θ be less
than 1/100th of a percentage point. When this criterion is met, the marginal percent increase in the sample likelihood
following an additional iteration is in the order of 10−2 percent.
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The basic problem that we are trying to solve is the following. We have a model positing that subjective
(reported) job security, −→s i, depends on a number of time-varying observed characteristics (
−→x i,
−→e i), on some
time-invariant individual characteristics zi, and on an unobserved time-invariant characteristic ki. Taking
up the notation (from the main text) Xi = {
−→s i,
−→x i,
−→e i}, we can write the joint probability of a typical
observation i (given parameter values Θ) as:
Pr (Xi, ki, zi|Θ) = Pr (Xi|ki, zi; Θ)× Pr (ki|zi; Θ)× Pr (zi)
= Pr (Xi|ki; Θ)× Pr (ki|zi; Θ)× Pr (zi) , (23)
where the second equality comes from the implicit assumption that Xi ⊥ zi|ki.
Our problem is to estimate the parameter Θ. Our approach to this problem takes two steps. We first
maximize the marginal sample likelihood of X, L (Θ;X) =
∫
ΠNi=1 Pr (Xi, ki|Θ) dk—that is, we integrate zi
out of (23) and maximize the resulting marginal likelihood. Second, we predict a value k̂i of ki for each i
following the protocol presented insubsection 4.2, and look at moments of the conditional distribution of this
predictor k̂i given zi—essentially, regressions of the form (11) compute E
(
k̂i|zi
)
. An obvious drawback of
this two-step approach is that k̂i is only an imperfect predictor of the true ki. As discussed in the main text,
this somewhat weakens the results obtained in our second step.
An alternative, more direct (one-step) approach to this problem would be to maximize the full sample
log-likelihood L (Θ;X, z) =
∫
ΠNi=1 Pr (Xi, ki, zi|Θ) dk. This can be done using for instance an EM algorithm
similar to the one described in Appendix B. Note however that this approach requires that one specifies
(parametrically) the conditional probability Pr (ki|zi; Θ). Given a parametric specification, this single-step
approach has the advantage (over the two-step approach) of directly delivering an estimate of the conditional
probability Pr (ki|zi; Θ), which is essentially what we are interested in in our step 2.
The problem with the single step approach is that the conditional distribution Pr (ki|zi; Θ) is not non-
parametrically identified. Yet the estimates obtained in the single-step method are a priori sensitive to the
particular parametric assumption made about the form of Pr (ki|zi; Θ). This problem is circumvented by the
two-step method, where we only impose an arbitrary structure on Pr (ki|zi; Θ) in the second and last step.
Step 1 of the two-step method thus delivers estimates of the subset of parameters that enter Pr (Xi|ki; Θ) and
of the marginal class probabilities Pr (ki) which are not polluted by potential specification errors affecting
Pr (ki|zi; Θ).
An additional advantage of the two-step method is that it is considerably less burdensome in terms of
computation. In particular, once step 1 is completed and the k̂i’s are constructed, we can try any specification
we want in the second-step regressions (11) at practically zero computational cost (since those are simple
linear regressions). By contrast, changing the specification of Pr (ki|zi; Θ) in the single-step method implies
re-running the whole likelihood maximization, which takes hours of computing time. This last practical
argument convinced us to opt for the two-step approach.
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Table A1: Number of individuals per country
AUT BEL DNK ESP FIN FRA
853 809 777 772 742 1,981
GBR GRC IRL ITA NLD PRT Total
1,471 936 339 931 1,521 959 12,091
Table A2: Observed transitions
between employment states
Current state eit = . . .
Permanent Permanent Temporary Nonemployment
Private Public
Past Permanent Private 92.41 1.75 2.89 2.94
state Permanent Public 4.44 92.36 1.30 1.90
eit−1 = . . . Temporary 32.21 6.57 47.67 13.55
Nonemployment 22.79 4.23 20.52 52.46
Table 1: Ordered Probit regression of job security1
Dependent variable: perceived job security (sit), 1997.
Explanatory Effect among workers whose job type is e = . . .
variables Permanent Private Permanent Public Temporary
Constant 0
(ref.)
−0.433
(.548)
−0.948
(.583)
Age (/10) −0.479
(.131)
−0.322
(.251)
−0.731
(.295)
Age-squared (/100) 0.053
(.017)
0.042
(.031)
0.093
(.040)
High education 0
(ref.)
0
(ref.)
0
(ref.)
Intermediate education −0.041
(.034)
−0.145
(.047)
0.119
(.093)
Low education −0.061
(.035)
−0.255
(.052)
−0.034
(.091)
Foreign −0.305
(.092)
0.048
(.238)
0.102
(.245)
Couple 0.015
(.038)
0.081
(.064)
0.013
(.083)
Has children 0.005
(.030)
0.006
(.048)
0.031
(.076)
Past unemployment experience −0.115
(.061)
−0.367
(.123)
−0.345
(.096)
Mean local unempl. rate2 0.241
(.356)
2.382
(.414)
−1.685
(.634)
EPL −0.138
(.017)
0.059
(.029)
0.038
(.054)
UIB 0.038
(.003)
0.036
(.005)
0.047
(.009)
Notes: 1Standard errors in parentheses.
2Mean over the observation period, 1997-2001.
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Table 2: Class probabilities
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8
0.061
(.006)
0.249
(.007)
0.044
(.006)
0.158
(.009)
0.134
(.006)
0.208
(.010)
0.055
(.006)
0.092
(.006)
Table 3: Job security fixed effects
Job state: Perm. priv. (ϕpprivk ) Perm. pub. (ϕ
ppub
k ) Temporary (ϕ
temp
k )
ϕ1 0
(ref.)
−3.76
(.124)
−3.73
(.099)
ϕ2 −0.98
(.067)
−0.68
(.093)
−1.16
(.130)
ϕ3 −2.10
(.087)
−2.11
(.111)
−3.02
(.084)
ϕ4 −2.11
(.076)
0.03
(.080)
−2.72
(.112)
ϕ5 −3.29
(.076)
−1.10
(.110)
−4.06
(.093)
ϕ6 −2.11
(.074)
−2.12
(.103)
−3.71
(.092)
ϕ7 −0.47
(.116)
−0.48
(.105)
−0.97
(.083)
ϕ8 0.84
(.090)
1.29
(.197)
0.43
(.109)
Mean1 −1.80 −0.98 −2.41
Note: 1The mean effect for each job state e equals
∑
k pkϕ
e
k, where the pk values
are those in Table 2.
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Table 4: Invariant job state distributions
Job state Invariant distributions (π∞′k · Mk = π
∞′
k ):
1,2

Perm. priv.
Perm. publ.
Temporary
Nonemp.
 π∞1 =

.822
.023
.124
.026
 π∞2 =

.905
.013
.031
.051
 π∞3 =

.469
.353
.068
.109


Perm. priv.
Perm. publ.
Temporary
Nonemp.
 π∞4 =

.299
.498
.137
.066
 π∞5 =

.266
.628
.035
.070
 π∞6 =

.855
.090
.019
.036


Perm. priv.
Perm. publ.
Temporary
Nonemp.
 π∞7 =

.084
.738
.072
.106
 π∞8 =

.468
.333
.010
.190
 π∞mean=

.604
.273
.053
.070

3
Notes: 1Subscripts designate classes.
2Standard errors are not reported (available on request).
3The mean distribution equals
∑
k pkπ
∞
k , where the pk values are those
in Table 1.
Table 5: Selection
Vector B
E
(
ϕppriv|e = ppriv
)
− E
(
ϕppriv|e 6= ppriv
)
= 0.345
E
(
ϕppub|e = ppub
)
− E
(
ϕppub|e 6= ppub
)
= 0.587
E
(
ϕtemp|e = temp
)
− E
(
ϕtemp|e 6= temp
)
= −0.275
Table 6: Estimated coefficients from
the job security equation (1)1
1997 0
(ref.)
2000 0.067
(.020)
1998 0.046
(.017)
2001 0.028
(.021)
1999 0.036
(.018)
local unempl. rate2 −1.226
(.455)
Notes: 1Standard errors in parentheses.
2In deviation from its 1997-2001 mean.
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Table 7: Second-step regressions—equation (11)1
Explanatory Dependent variable:
variables (zi) ϕ̂
ppriv
i (perm. priv.) ϕ̂
ppub
i (perm. pub.) ϕ̂
temp
i (temporary)
Constant −0.593
(.179)
−0.440
(.189)
−1.400
(.224)
Age (/10) −0.403
(.099)
−0.367
(.104)
−0.488
(.124)
Age-squared (/100) 0.050
(.013)
0.054
(.014)
0.064
(.016)
High education 0
(ref.)
0
(ref.)
0
(ref.)
Intermediate education −0.009
(.026)
−0.074
(.028)
−0.032
(.033)
Low education −0.163
(.028)
−0.199
(.029)
−0.246
(.035)
Foreign −0.254
(.081)
−0.126
(.085)
−0.274
(.101)
Couple 0.052
(.030)
0.031
(.032)
0.077
(.038)
Has children −0.024
(.026)
−0.009
(.026)
−0.037
(.031)
Past unemployment experience −0.172
(.043)
−0.119
(.045)
−0.258
(.054)
Mean local unempl. rate2 −0.424
(.241)
0.380
(.254)
−0.618
(.301)
EPL −0.148
(.015)
0.007
(.016)
−0.134
(.019)
UIB 0.883
(.079)
0.179
(.083)
1.400
(.099)
Notes: 1Standard errors in parentheses.
2Mean over the observation period, 1997-2001.
Table 8: Job security and policy
Dependent variable: ϕ̂ppub − ϕ̂temp ϕ̂ppub − ϕ̂ppriv ϕ̂ppriv − ϕ̂temp
EPL 0.141
(.013)
0.155
(.018)
−0.013
(.011)
UIB −0.746
(.069)
−0.705
(.097)
−0.041
(.060)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 2: raw job security and EPL
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Figure 3: raw job security and UIB
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Figure A1: distribution of workers across job states, 1997
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